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The Fourth Amendment's Prohibition of
Unreasonable Search and Seizure Does Not Prevent
the Police from Implementing a Traffic Roadblock
for the Purpose of Soliciting Information Related to
a Specific Crime: Illinois v. Lidster
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH
AND SEIZURE - POLICE CHECKPOINTS - The United States
Supreme Court held that traffic roadblocks are reasonable if they
are set up by the police in order to obtain information from the
drivers about a specific crime, and therefore they do not violate
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 888 (2004).
In August of 1997, Robert Lidster was detained at a police road-
block, subjected to field sobriety tests, and then arrested for driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol.' The Lombard Police Depart-
ment had set up the highway checkpoint in response to a fatal hit-
and-run accident that occurred a week earlier in the same loca-
tion, at approximately the same time of night.' The purpose of the
checkpoint was to gather any available information about the ac-
cident from the drivers of the stopped vehicles.' At this roadblock,
a police officer would detain each vehicle for approximately 10 to
15 seconds in order to hand a flyer to the driver and then ask the
driver if they had seen anything happen on the night of the acci-
dent.4 As Lidster was proceeding through the checkpoint, he al-
most hit one of the officers with his van.' That officer smelled al-
cohol on Lidster's breath, and therefore directed Lidster's vehicle
over to a side street where another officer administered a sobriety
1. Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 888 (2004).
2. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888. A 70 year-old postal worker was killed as he was riding
his bicycle home from work. 18 Month Sentence in Hit-Run Death, CHICAGE TRIBUNE, Dec.
6, 1997, available at 1997 WL 3619283. A 23 year-old man was arrested and convicted of
the crime several months later. Id.
3. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888.
4. Id
5. Id. Lidster had already been questioned and was leaving the roadblock when he
almost hit the officer. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
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test, which Lidster failed.6 This resulted in his arrest, and ulti-
mately, his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.7
Lidster disputed the validity of the arrest, arguing that the
relevant evidence in the case against him was obtained pursuant
to an unconstitutional stop.8 Specifically, he argued that the
highway checkpoint at which he was apprehended violated the
Fourth Amendment.9 The trial court disagreed with Lidster's ar-
gument, however, and denied Lidster's pretrial motion to quash
his arrest, subjecting him to a jury trial that resulted in a guilty
verdict."°
On appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District,
Lidster renewed his argument that the roadblock was unconstitu-
tional, basing this on the theory that the checkpoint failed to meet
a balancing test that was formulated by federal and state courts
for determining whether a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." However, after the state and Lidster had already
filed their appellate briefs, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided the case of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond." The Edmond
decision seemed to overshadow the use of the balancing test in the
Illinois courts' analysis of constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment. 3 In Edmond, the police set up a roadblock to look
for evidence of drug crimes; they were attempting to stem the flow
of illegal drugs without knowledge that any specific crime had oc-
curred. 4 Because there was no individualized suspicion involved,
the Supreme Court found that this roadblock was made for the
6. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421. The officer did not know whether any laws
had been violated, but decided to question Lidster based on a "feeling that something might
be wrong." Id.
7. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888.
8. Id.
9. Id. The Fourth Amendment states:
[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [olath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421. Lidster was sentenced to one year of court
supervision, counseling, fourteen days in an alternative work program, and a $200 fine.
People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. 2002).
11. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421. The balancing test referred to is principally
derived from the case of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 891.
This test weighs the public interest in conducting the roadblock against the intrusion on
the rights of the motorists. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421.
12. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
13. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 421-23.
14. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888-89.
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general purpose of controlling crime, and ruled that the Fourth
Amendment forbade such seizures in the absence of special cir-
cumstances." The Appellate Court of Illinois relied on Edmond to
reverse Lidster's conviction. 8 Also relying on Edmond, and using
the same reasoning as the appellate court, the Supreme Court of
Illinois upheld the reversal of Lidster's conviction. 7
The Supreme Court of Illinois began its analysis of the case by
reviewing Edmond, and then disagreeing with the State about the
relevance of Edmond to Lidster's case. 8 The State sought to dis-
tinguish Edmond from the roadblock at issue here, on the grounds
that this roadblock was conducted to assist the police in solving a
specific crime, and that the police were not attempting to gather
information or evidence against the drivers themselves, as they
were in Edmond.9 Therefore, according to the State, the efforts of
the Lombard Police Department were constitutional and did not
amount to a highway checkpoint conducted for the purpose of gen-
eral crime control.2" But the Supreme Court of Illinois declared
that the State's interpretation of Edmond was incorrect, and held
that Edmond was determinative in Lidster's case.2
According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the State's argument
ignored the general rule given in Edmond -- that a seizure will
ordinarily violate the Fourth Amendment if it is done without any
"individualized suspicion of wrongdoing," and that a seizure con-
ducted for the general purpose of crime control falls under this
forbidden category.22 The majority opinion continued by stating
that there is no difference between seizures in which the police
gather information leading to the arrest of one of the motorists,
and where the police merely gather information from motorists
that will lead to the arrest of someone else -- both types of police
efforts are directed at general crime control and, therefore, both
are unconstitutional.23 After giving these rationales for applying
Edmond to Lidster's case, the opinion goes on to give several sta-
tistics on the number of various felonies committed in the state of
15. Id. at 889.
16. People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d at 423.
17. People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 885, 861 (Ill. 2002). Justice Freeman delivered the
opinion of the court. Id. at 856.




22. People v. Lidster (2002), 779 N.E.2d at 859.
23. Id. at 859-60.
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Illinois. 4 This was done to illustrate that an excusal of the police
conduct in this case would condone roadblocks in other felony
cases, creating an unacceptable proliferation of these informa-
tional roadblocks.25 Finally, the court's opinion addressed the con-
tention that this type of situation would fall under a limited ex-
ception given in Edmond, allowing for emergency roadblocks con-
ducted for such circumstances as catching a terrorist or a violent
criminal who is likely to flee by a particular route.26 But in the
eyes of the Illinois Supreme Court, these scenarios were quite dif-
ferent from the roadblock in Lidster's case, as, in Lidster, there
was no evidence that the criminal remained in the vicinity or that
he posed any further threat to the community. Therefore the nec-
essary exigent circumstances called for in Edmond did not exist in
the Lidster case and the narrow exception did not apply.27 Due to
the State's failure to distinguish Edmond, the Supreme Court of
Illinois upheld the reversal of Lidster's conviction, and concluded
by stating that the goals of the police were laudable, but neverthe-
less amounted to an unreasonable seizure.2"
On the other hand, the dissent argued that the majority was in-
correctly interpreting Edmond.29 The roadblock in Edmond was of
an entirely different nature and the Supreme Court's ruling pro-
scribing such roadblocks could not be read to categorically ban all
informational roadblocks conducted for the purpose of solving a
specific, known crime.3 ° Because Lidster's seizure was conducted
pursuant to an effort by police to gain information regarding a
specific crime, it did not have the general crime control purpose
that was proscribed in Edmond.3 Additionally, a general crime
control purpose did not apply here because the highway seizure
had a connection with the goal of promoting highway safety.32 In
addition to these reasons, the dissent found support for their posi-
tion from the Virginia Supreme Court in Burns v. Common-
wealth,33 the only other case decided since Edmond that involved
24. Id. at 860.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. People v. Lidster (2002), 779 N.E.2d at 860.
28. Id. at 861.
29. Id. at 862 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 863 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. People v. Lidster (2002), 779 N.E.2d at 864. The dissent found support for this
proposition in the rationale of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
33. 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001).
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an informational stop.34 Because the dissent did not believe that
the Edmond decision was applicable to the present case, they
thought that only the balancing test, which was originally advo-
cated by Lidster, ought to be applied.35 However, unlike Lidster,
the dissent felt that the police were justified in using the road-
block under the balancing test, and would therefore reverse the
lower appellate court's decision and uphold Lidster's conviction."
Finally, the dissenting opinion denounced the majority's sugges-
tion that there would be a proliferation of roadblocks, stating that
the statistics given by the majority were irrelevant to the present
case, and that police resources would be too scarce for such a pro-
liferation to happen.37
After the decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted Illinois' petition for a writ of
certiorari38 to determine whether the Edmond decision would act
to prohibit police from conducting an interrogational roadblock for
the sole purpose of gathering information related to a crime that
had occurred a week earlier in the same location. 9 The United
States Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice
Breyer, began its analysis by immediately distinguishing the
roadblock in Edmond from the roadblock at issue in Lidster's
40case.
First of all, the checkpoint at issue in Lidster's case was signifi-
cantly different in the Court's eyes from that of Edmond, because,
in Lidster, the purpose of the stop was not to conduct general
crime control, but rather to ask the public for help in solving a
crime committed by someone other than the driver being
stopped. 4' According to Justice Breyer, when Edmond was de-
cided, the information-seeking roadblock issue was not before the
Court, and the language of Edmond, which proscribes general
34. People v. Lidster (2002), 779 N.E.2d at 864-65. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the arrest of a murderer after he was captured through an informational roadblock. Id.
35. Id.at 865 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 865-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 867 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38. Illinois v. Lidster, 538 U.S. 1012 (2003) (granting certiorari). The Supreme Court
decided to hear this case because of the conflicting decisions in Illinois and Virginia. Lid-
ster, 124 S. Ct. at 888.
39. See Brief for the Petitioner, at i, (The state's and Lidster's separate formulations of
the question presented).
40. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888-89. Justice Breyer delivered the majority opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas




crime control roadblocks, cannot be read to include such informa-
tion--seeking stops.4 After dispelling the notion that Edmond
controlled the present case, Breyer went on to note that the
Fourth Amendment itself does not outlaw all seizures that are
conducted without individualized suspicion.4 3 For example, sobri-
ety checkpoints and Border Patrol checkpoints are consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, although these types of roadblocks do not
involve any individualized suspicion toward the detainees." Fur-
thermore, because Breyer stated that the concept of individualized
suspicion is inapposite to the concept of seeking information from
the public, the constitutionality of the Lidster roadblock could not
depend on whether the police held any individualized suspicion
toward the motorists.5
Justice Breyer continued the analysis, further separating the
present case from Edmond by remarking that informational stops,
such as the one in the Lidster case, are less likely to be intrusive
or to provoke anxiety in the drivers because the public is often ea-
ger to help law enforcement officials in their crime--solving goals. 6
Moreover, the law allows such help from the public and allows
police to solicit this help if needed.4 ' Breyer conceded that there is
a greater intrusion upon the motorist who is stopped when com-
pared with the traditionally acceptable questioning of a pedes-
trian." But the inconvenience caused by this intrusion is likely to
be slight, and would probably be no greater than the usual traffic
delays.4 ' Furthermore, the Court reasoned that it would not be
proper to allow the police to seek the voluntary help of pedestri-
ans, but not the voluntary help of motorists. °
The majority opinion concluded its criticism of the Illinois Su-
preme Court's decision by dispelling the idea that allowing infor-
mational roadblocks would cause a proliferation of police check-
points. 1 According to Justice Breyer, the fears of the Illinois ap-
pellate court are unfounded. Justice Breyer reasoned that, just as
sobriety checkpoints, although legal, have not been widely used,
42. Id. at 889.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 889.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 889-90.
48. Id. at 890.
49. Id.




also it is likely that informational roadblocks, if condoned by the
Court, would not unreasonably increase in number due to commu-
nity hostility and limited police resources.
52
After Justice Breyer explained why the rule espoused in Ed-
mond did not apply here, he further stated that information--
seeking roadblocks are not automatically unconstitutional, as the
Illinois Supreme Court held; rather, these roadblocks must, like
every other seizure, pass the reasonableness test that was set
forth in Brown v. Texas.53 This test weighs "the gravity of the pub-
lic concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty.,54
In applying the test, Justice Breyer first stated that the "public
concern was grave" -- a known, specific crime had resulted in
someone's death, and the killer was at--large.55 Second, the road-
block effectively advanced this concern by tailoring the time and
place of the roadblock to target the citizens who were most likely
to be helpful." Finally, the conduct of the police in asking their
questions, handing out flyers, and stopping the cars for only a few
seconds only minimally interfered with the drivers' Fourth
Amendment liberty interests.57 The checkpoint at issue in the
Lidster case therefore passed the Brown reasonableness test and
the Supreme Court of the United States accordingly reversed the
judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and upheld Lidster's con-
viction.58
The Lidster opinion, however, included a short additional opin-
ion written by Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.59 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's distinction
between roadblocks that seize citizens in order to determine
whether they have committed a crime, and roadblocks such as the
informational one in Lidster's case, where the police are only
searching for information relating to a specific, earlier crime."
But, according to Justice Stevens, the facts on the record were
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 890 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).




59. Id. at 891-92 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and
Souter joined in Justice Stevens' opinion. Id.
60. Illinois, 124 S. Ct. at 891-92 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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simply not developed enough to enable him to make any determi-
nation as to whether the roadblock was unconstitutionally intru-
sive, or whether this particular means of investigation was uncon-
stitutionally ineffective in addressing the public concern.6 There-
fore, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the informa-
tional search during which Lidster was arrested was not unconsti-
tutional on its face; however, Justice Stevens was in favor of re-
manding the case to the Illinois courts for a factual determination
of whether the stop violated second or third prong of the Brown
reasonableness test.62 Despite Justice Stevens' dissention in part,
all nine Justices agreed that an information-seeking police check-
point is not automatically unconstitutional, and that such a road-
block must, like any other seizure, pass the reasonableness test
that has been developed and refined through several decades of
Supreme Court decisions.63
The Supreme Court of the United States first considered the
constitutionality of police roadblocks/checkpoints in the mid-
seventies in a series of cases involving the United States Border
Patrol.64 In the southwestern United States, police checkpoints
and roving patrols were used by the Border Patrol inside the coun-
try to curb the flow of illegal immigrants from Mexico. 5 The con-
stitutionality of these Border Patrol tactics were challenged for
the first time in 1973 in the case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States.
66
In Almeida-Sanchez, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of roving patrols, during which Border
Patrol officers would pull over vehicles near the Mexican border
without probable cause and then search those vehicles for illegal
aliens. In the Court's opinion, these roving patrols were con-
61. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. Id. at 888.
64. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891 (1976); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
65. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 268-75. This case involved a Mexican citizen, legally in the United States on
a work permit, who was pulled over by a roving patrol and searched on a desolate road
twenty-five miles north of the border. Id. at 267-68. The Border Patrol conceded that there
was no probable cause for the actions of the roving patrol, which resulted in the man's
arrest for marijuana possession. Id. It should be noted that the Court primarily focused on
the constitutionality of the subsequent vehicle search, as opposed to whether the original
seizure was lawful. Id.
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ducted unconstitutionally." According to the Court's majority
opinion, written by Justice Stewart, probable cause must exist
before a person's vehicle may be searched.69 Justice Stewart did
refer to Border Patrol checkpoints in the opinion, but the facts did
not require him to directly address the constitutionality of the
checkpoints at that time." However, the protection from intrusion
afforded by the court in Almeida-Sanchez was used by the Court
several years later in the context of police roadblocks.
In 1975, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to rule on the
propriety of Border Patrol checkpoints in the case of United States
v. Ortiz, which involved a checkpoint search that was conducted
without probable cause.2 In a lower ruling regarding the Ortiz
matter, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had extended
the Almeida-Sanchez decision to also cover Border Patrol check-
point searches, rendering them unconstitutional when conducted
in the absence of probable cause. 3 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Powell agreed with the Ninth Circuit and
reiterated the application of the Fourth Amendment to vehicle
searches as set forth in the Almeida-Sanchez case, stating that no
vehicle may be searched absent either probable cause or the con-
sent of the driver. 4 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's decision, ruling the search unconstitutional and over-
turning the defendant's conviction.7 5 However, Justice Powell de-
clined to express an opinion on the bigger issue -- the constitu-
tionality of the checkpoint itself.76 He stated: "We also need not
decide... whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop motor-
ists for questioning at an established checkpoint without reason to
believe that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens."77 Thus, the
68. Id. at 273.
69. Id. at 268.
70. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 275-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1976).
72. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 891.
The record in Ortiz shows that at a checkpoint in San Clemente, CA, which was in opera-
tion about two-thirds of the time, the Border Patrol stopped and searched a car with no
probable cause. Id. at 891-92. This search revealed three illegal Mexican immigrants,
resulting in the conviction of the driver. Id.
73. Id. at 892. The Ninth Circuit's opinion was unreported. Id.
74. Id. at 896-97.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 897.
77. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 897 n.3.
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Court left the door open for a later ruling on the constitutionality
of the initial seizure itself.
8
Just over a year later, the Supreme Court finally decided
whether the initial seizure at a Border Patrol checkpoint comports
with the Fourth Amendment.7 ' The case of United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte involved the consolidated appeals of three California
cases and one Texas case, all involving the transportation of ille-
gal immigrants into the United States." Unlike Ortiz, where it
was assumed that the seizure was lawful and the constitutionality
of the subsequent search alone was in question, the Martinez-
Fuerte defendants challenged the constitutionality of the check-
points themselves.81 These defendants sought to have all such
checkpoints deemed unconstitutional because, according to the
Martinez-Fuerte defendants, the incriminating evidence was not
gleaned from a search; rather, each driver incriminated himself in
the midst of questioning from a Border Patrol officer once his car
was stopped at the checkpoint.82
In deciding the constitutionality of the checkpoint seizures in
Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Powell began by reviewing the positive
aspects of these checkpoints.83 First, he looked at the effectiveness
of the checkpoints, and concluded, in agreement with the United
States Border Patrol, that the Border Patrol checkpoints were an
indispensable tool in the battle against illegal immigration. He
then observed that there was no way a checkpoint could be oper-
ated on a highway such that the only vehicles stopped would be
the ones that arouse reasonable suspicion in the eyes of the Bor-
der Patrol agents.85 Next, Justice Powell analyzed the way these
checkpoints were conducted in comparison to other law enforce-
ment methods, and determined that they were conducted in a rea-
sonable manner and resulted in a relatively minimal intrusion
into the liberties of the drivers, even in the case of drivers who
were diverted off the road and into special stalls for more intense
questioning.86 Finally, Justice Powell stated that the Fourth
78. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1976).
79. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551-64..
80. Id. at 545-50. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 545.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 545-50.
83. Id. at 551-53.
84. Id.
85. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-57.
86. Id. at 557-60. The opinion briefly acknowledged that these checkpoints often result
in the diversion of drivers to secondary inspection areas largely on the basis of their appar-
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Amendment affords less protection to people in automobiles than
to people in the sanctity of their private dwellings.87
Justice Powell weighed all of these considerations favoring the
Border Patrol's interests and against the liberty interests of the
drivers being stopped and found that the government's interests
sufficiently outweighed those of the drivers.88 Therefore, the Court
ruled that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Border
Patrol may stop drivers at these checkpoints and question them
without any reasonable suspicion.8 Furthermore, following the
same reasoning, no warrant would be necessary for the operation
of these checkpoints. °
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, strongly dissented
from the opinion of the majority.8 ' These dissenters protested
what they perceived to be the latest in a line of cases decided in
that term which eviscerated the rights granted by the Fourth
Amendment. 2 Justice Brennan stated that the majority's decision
in Martinez-Fuerte could not be reconciled with the recent deci-
sions in Ortiz and Almeida-Sanchez.9 He dispelled the majority's
balancing process of weighing governmental interests against in-
dividual liberties, alleging that it was a pretense for justifying ar-
bitrary government action. 4 Justice Brennan, who viewed the
checkpoints as unreasonable searches and seizures, lamented the
discrimination that the majority's ruling allowed toward those of
Mexican descent as they passed through these checkpoints.8"
After its ruling in Martinez-Fuerte that police checkpoints can
be constitutional, the United States Supreme Court did not con-
sider the constitutionality of any other specific police roadblock
until 1990, in the DUI checkpoint case of Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz.98 However, there were two other cases decided
in 1979 that, while not deciding the constitutionality of a specific
ent Mexican ancestry; however, in addressing this, the Court stated "we perceive no
constitutional violation." Id. at 563.
87. Id. at 561-62.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 562-64.
90. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 564-67.
91. Id. at 567-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 568-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 569-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 571-72.
96. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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roadblock, significantly contributed to the way that the Supreme
Court would later view roadblocks.97
The first of these cases was that of Delaware v. Prouse, in which
the issue of whether a police officer may randomly stop a driver
for the purpose of checking his or her license and registration ma-
terials, even though the officer did not observe the driver commit
any violations was considered.9" The Supreme Court answered
this question in the negative.9" In the majority opinion, Justice
White did recognize that there was a governmental interest in
promting safety on the roadways, and that randomly spot check-
ing drivers' licenses was related to that interest because such ran-
dom checks can help police keep unsafe drivers off of the road.
According to Justice White, however, this safety interest did not
rise to the level of overcoming the driver's opposing interest in
freedom from such police intrustions.1°' Justice White sought to
make it clear that the ruling would not preclude license spot
checks that were less intrusive and that did not allow unbridled
discretion on the part of the officer in deciding whom to pull
over. 1' Justice White suggested that the questioning of all traffic
at a roadblock may be a less intrusive and arbitrary means for
license checks; in suggesting this, he implicitly approved the use
of checkpoints for traffic safety purposes.
The second important case decided in 1979, Brown v. Texas, did
not involve automobiles at all."0 Rather, it involved a pedestrian
stopped by the police without any articulable reason for suspicion
on the part of the police, other than the fact that the defendant
was observed walking in a high crime area."°4 In seeking to pre-
vent the same type of arbitrary government action proscribed in
Prouse, Chief Justice Burger announced a balancing test of three
factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of a seizure:
"Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a
97. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
98. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650-51. Prouse involved a driver who was stopped because the
officer was not doing anything else at the time and saw his car go by. Id. The driver was
arrested because the officer saw marijuana in plain view after approaching the vehicle. Id.
99. Id. at 663. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 650.
100. Id. at 659.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Brown, 443 U.S. 47. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at
48.
104. Id. at 48-50. Zackary Brown was arrested for violating Texas Penal Code §
38.02(a), which made it a crime to refuse to give one's name to the police when asked. Id.
at 49; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a)(1974).
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weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the sei-
zure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest,
and the severity of the interference with individual liberty."'05 Al-
though Chief Justice Burger set forth this test rather casually in
the text of his opinion, it eventually became an essential tool for
deciding later roadblock cases."6
This balancing test became the rationale for upholding the con-
stitutionality of police DUI checkpoints in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, despite a very emphatic dissent by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. °7 In the Sitz case, the state of Michigan
instituted a checkpoint system whereby all cars would be stopped
on certain roadways and the drivers briefly examined for signs of
intoxication."0 ' In a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment challenge
to the constitutionality of these checkpoints, the Michigan courts
weighed the three prongs of the Brown balancing test, finding that
the state did have an important interest in limiting drunk driving,
but that these DUI checkpoints were ineffective in promoting that
interest and their intrusion on individual liberties was substan-
tial; therefore, the Michigan courts struck down these checkpoints
as unconstitutional seizures.
In the government's appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties
challenging the constitutionality of the checkpoints argued that
the Michigan courts that had supported their claim used the
wrong analysis; they argued that the balancing test should not
have been used and that a proper analysis would entail determin-
ing whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed for the
stops." ' The Supreme Court's opinion differed, however; the Court
believed that the Brown balancing test was the proper way to ana-
lyze the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of police roadblocks."'
105. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51. The Supreme Court used this test to overturn the defen-
dant's conviction. Id. at 52.
106. See, e.g., Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 885; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444.
107. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456.
108. Id. at 447-48. This is not a case where the defendant was arrested by police at a
checkpoint; rather, the defendants were the Michigan State Police and the persons bringing
the action were licensed Michigan drivers seeking injunctive relief from impending check-
points. Id. at 448.
109. Id. at 448-49.
110. Id. at 449-50. The citizens argued that the 1989 Supreme Court decision of Treas-
ury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), dictated that the balancing test only be
used when there is a special governmental need, and here the state had exhibited no such
need. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 459-60.
111. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist then applied the balancing test to the
specific facts of the Michigan DUI checkpoint program.'12
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed that the state had an in-
disputable interest in eliminating the problem of drunken driv-
ing."' He then compared this extremely important state interest
against the intrusion upon the rights of motorists.14 In Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion, the Michigan courts had wrongly consid-
ered the subjective intrusion that would be felt by a drunk driver.
Rather, according to Chief Justice Reinquist, the courts should
have considered only the objectively intrusive factors of the stop
itself, such as the amount of time the drivers were detained, com-
bined with the subjective effect these factors would have on a law-
abiding citizen."5 Just as it did in the Martinez-Fuerte case, the
United States Supreme Court found that the intrusion upon the
drivers stopped at these checkpoints is relatively minimal when
compared to the state interests in eradicating drunk driving."1
6
Next, the Court's opinion gave consideration to the overall effec-
tiveness of DUI checkpoints in curbing drunken driving."' Chief
Justice Rehnquist, although careful to note that the choice of law
enforcement methods belongs to politically accountable officials,
still looked at the factual record and determined that these check-
points are effective in catching drunk drivers, just as the check-
points in Martinez-Fuerte were effective in catching illegal immi-
grants.' 8 Unlike the ineffective random stops at issue in Prouse,
these checkpoints achieved the state interest without the same
"kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion" that the Court
had previously condemned in Prouse."9 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion considered the important state interest, the minimal indi-
vidual intrusion, and the effectiveness of the checkpoints, and de-
termined that the Michigan DUI checkpoint program was consis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment.'20
112. Id. at 451-52.
113. Id. at 451. The opinion states that "[dirunk drivers cause an annual death toll of
over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more
than five billion dollars in property damage." Id.
114. Id. at 451-53.
115. Id. at 452.
116. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
117. Id. at 453-55.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 454-55 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).
120. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
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Justice Blackmun would only go so far as to concur in the judg-
ment alone, although he gave no alternative rationale for reaching
this judgment. 12' His only comment was to commend the majority
for finally stressing the tragic massacre of innocent lives on
American roads by drunk drivers. 2'
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, however, dissented from
the majority's decision and stressed that the Court should not
automatically engage in a balancing test for each and every sei-
zure that takes place on the roads. 1"' Rather, according to the dis-
senting opinion, the balancing test should be used only for those
seizures that are "minimally intrusive." 4 Therefore, the analysis
as to the level of intrusiveness should be the first thing that the
Court looked at, not the last, as was the case in Sitz."' Justice
Brennan also felt that the same showing of need for seizures with-
out reasonable suspicion that had been made in Martinez-Fuerte
in the illegal alien context had not been made here."6 Perhaps, he
suggested, there were other ways of determining whether a driver
was intoxicated, without pulling him over; whereas in the case of
Martinez-Fuerte there was no possibility of detecting illegal immi-
grants without stopping each car."' He recognized that society
was likely to receive the Sitz decision well, but that this did not
justify abdicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment."'
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion, agreeing in
part with the opinion written by Justice Brennan."9 Justice Ste-
vens' dissent was more forceful than the Brennan dissent, how-
ever, and critical of the majority opinion.' First of all, in Justice
Stevens' opinion, the majority greatly underestimated the intru-
sion caused by an unannounced roadblock at night and the fear
that such a roadblock could instill in even law-abiding citizens.' 3'
Furthermore, the arbitrariness that the Court had previously at-
tacked in cases such as Prouse still existed here; an officer was
still free to randomly subject any motorist to sobriety checks,
121. Id. at 455-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 456-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 458-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id.at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 460-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 463-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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which heightened intrusion into the liberties of law-abiding citi-
zens.'32 In addition to this heightened intrusion, the effectiveness
of sobriety checkpoints was, in Justice Stevens' opinion, highly
speculative, if not altogether non-existent.3 3 In fact, Justice Ste-
vens claimed that any apparent effectiveness of these checkpoints
is more likely caused by the intense publicity given to them by the
media, and just because a certain practice sets a public example
for others does not justify it; as Justice Scalia stated in Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, "the impairment of individual liberties
cannot be the means of making a point. . . ."' Justice Stevens
thought that the majority had weighed the various factors of the
balancing test wrongly, underestimating the intrusiveness of the
checkpoints and overestimating their effectiveness, and for these
reasons, he vehemently disagreed with the majority and believed
that the Michigan DUI checkpoints should have been considered
unconstitutional. 135
Ten years later, the Supreme Court agreed to hear another very
controversial roadblock case, the interpretation of which would
become an important part of the Supreme Court's decision in Illi-
nois v. Lidster.'36 After deciding the constitutionality of border
patrol and DUI checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Su-
preme Court took the opportunity to consider a checkpoint whose
primary purpose was to control the flow of illegal drugs in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond.'37 In the Edmond case, the police would
stop groups of cars, and then would ask each driver for their li-
cense and registration materials and look for signs of intoxica-
tion.' In addition to these now-commonplace procedures, the po-
lice would look inside each car through the windows and run drug-
sniffing dogs around the outside of the car."'
Justice O'Connor began the majority opinion for the Edmond
case by noting the cases in which the Court has upheld suspi-
132. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 460-62, 468-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 475-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 686-67
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
135. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34; Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 888-89.
137. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court. Id.
138. Id. at 34-36. This action was started by two men seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief after being stopped, but not arrested, at one of the checkpoints. Id.
139. Id. The fact that dogs walked around the car did not transform this seizure into a
search, pursuant to the decision in United States v. Place; therefore, the presence of the
dogs apparently played no role in Justice O'Connor's decision. Id. (citing United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
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cionless seizures, and the reasons why they were allowed. 140 The
reason for upholding the suspicionless seizures in Martinez-Fuerte
was the exceptional needs of the government in policing the bor-
der.' In Sitz, on the other hand, the seizures were justified by
the obviously close connection "between the imperative of highway
safety and the law enforcement practice at issue."' 2 Finally, Jus-
tice O'Connor discussed Prouse and commented that the Court
had said that it would permit a hypothetical roadblock for the
purpose of checking licenses because of a similar relationship to
roadway safety, as in Sitz."' However, Justice O'Connor also re-
called that in Prouse, the Court distinguished between allowing
such license checks for the purpose of highway safety, and allow-
ing them for the purpose of general interest in crime control."'
The Court had prohibited this latter purpose."'
The majority of the court believed that the primary purpoe of
the checkpoint at issue in Edmond was the detection of "ordinary
criminal wrongdoing"-- a purpose that was never condoned by the
Court in prior case law.'46 Hence, Justice O'Connor stated that the
checkpoint program at issue violated the Fourth Amendment
without even engaging in any sort of balancing test, such as that
which had been applied in Brown.'47 Therefore, the Court refused
to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion be-
fore a seizure can occur for the purpose of "ordinary crime con-
trol., ,48
Justice O'Connor also dispelled the state's notions that the
checkpoint at issue in the Edmond case could be likened to those
in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. 4 9  First, according to Justice
O'Connor, there was no similar highway safety concern like there
was in Sitz, and, although there was a similar contraband nature
to the crime as in Martinez-Fuerte, the border patrol context of
that case was far different than the drug situation in Indiana. 50
140. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-40.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. at 39-40.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39-40.
146. Id. at 40-44.
147. Id.
148. Id. The Court's opinion did contemplate several circumstances where individual-
ized suspicion could be suspended for "ordinary crime control" purposes, such as an im-
pending terrorist attack or a fleeing, dangerous criminal. Id. at 44.
149. Id. at 40-44.
150. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-44.
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Finally, Justice O'Connor dismissed the state's argument that it
had valid secondary purposes for the checkpoint, such as checking
licenses and controlling intoxicated drivers, and that the Court
should not look further into the checkpoint to determine what the
police department's primary purpose was for the roadblock."' Jus-
tice O'Connor first stated that prior Supreme Court decisions did
not prevent the Court from making such an inquiry.'52 She then
reasoned that without such an inquiry, one could imagine a veri-
table plethora of situations where unconstitutional seizures could
be justified if they only include in their purposes a license or so-
briety check."5 Therefore, in the majority's opinion, no matter
what secondary purposes the state had in mind, this search was
unconstitutional because its primary purpose was an unconstitu-
tional one -- "general interest in crime control.""4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, felt that the legality of the
checkpoint in Edmond followed naturally after the decisions in
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz."' As was the situation in these two
prior cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist felt that the intrusions into
the lives of the drivers were sufficiently minimal."' At the same
time, several of the checkpoint's purposes, namely those of check-
ing licenses and looking for signs of intoxication, had been con-
doned as vital state interests in Prouse and Sitz, such that the
Court upheld the checkpoint seizures without the need for indi-
vidualized suspicion in those cases."7 Because of these valid rea-
sons for enacting this minimally intrusive roadblock, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the drug interdiction purpose was irrele-
vant, and that there should not be any inquiry into the subjective
purposes of the police department conducting the roadblock."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued in his dissent, pointing out
that the majority was now utilizing a new test for determining the
constitutionality of roadblocks, the "non-law-enforcement primary
purpose test.""5 He noted that the Court had already rejected a
151. Id. at 45-46.
152. Id. at 45-47.
153. Id. at 46-47.
154. Id. 48.
155. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined in this portion of the dissent. Id. at 48.
156. Id. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 50-51(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 51-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996)).
159. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not take
part in this portion of the dissent. Id. at 48.
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similar non-law-enforcement primary purpose test in Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz in favor of the Brown balancing
test.160 In Sitz, the Court had dispelled the notion that there must
be some special showing of governmental need, beyond the usual
need for ordinary law enforcement, before a suspicionless seizure
could be effectuated on the highways. 6' Chief Justice Rehnquist
followed this reasoning by arguing that this "special needs" show-
ing must only be made in circumstances involving suspicionless
searches of a person's home or body -- in any other circumstance,
such as a roadblock seizure, the balancing test is applicable.'62 So
in Edmond, Chief Justice Rehnquist would have followed Sitz and
applied the original Brown balancing test, not this new test in
which the Court sought to determine whether the police had the
unlawful primary purpose of general law enforcement.163 This new
test, in Rehnquist's opinion, was bound to inspire new litigation
over the purpose of police roadblocks, and placed all police check-
points into doubt because now they may be deemed unconstitu-
tional if it can be shown that the police had an unlawful agenda
hiding behind an otherwise legitimate roadblock.16
Although Justice Thomas joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent, he wrote separately to convey an additional viewpoint.65
In this brief dissent, he stated that Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz com-
pelled him to view the Edmond stop as a constitutional seizure.
However, he stated that he was not convinced that Martinez-
Fuerte and Sitz were correctly decided, and that he doubted that
the original Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have found
these suspicionless stops to be reasonable.'
In these last few words of his Edmond dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Thomas reflected doubt about the entire jurisprudential his-
tory that eventually led to the latest roadblock ruling in Lidster v.
Illinois. The truth is that the wisdom behind the Lidster decision,
or the lack thereof, cannot be fully grasped unless one looks at the
foundation upon which it was based. This foundation has been
160. Id. at 54-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 53-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50).
162. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 55-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas declined to ad-
dress this issue any further because the citizens originally seeking the injunction had not
raised the issue themselves. Id.
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highly controversial, and there exists no argument for, or against,
suspicionless roadblock seizures that will please everyone. But all
scholars of the law should agree that the preservation of the Con-
stitution of the United States of America is paramount. It sepa-
rates modern America from the fear and oppression that was so
prevalent behind the Iron Curtain, while at the same time pre-
serving order and safety in the land. This can be a delicate bal-
ancing act. The Fourth Amendment was crafted to perform this
balancing act between the everyday lives of ordinary citizens and
the duties of the police, who are the frontlines of government
power.
Justice Burger did an excellent job of articulating the way a
court should use the Fourth Amendment to balance these some-
times contrary interests in Brown v. Texas.'68 But, when using
this test to weigh the competing interests in Fourth Amendment
search and seizure issues, a court should keep in mind, first and
foremost, the consequences of unchecked government power. As
Justice Jackson said:
[tihese [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective
in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government.9
Therefore, a court should very carefully weigh the future conse-
quences when deciding that a governmental interest overrides an
individual's liberty interests, thereby turning an otherwise unrea-
sonable search into a reasonable one.
A wise person once said that the road to hell is paved with good
intentions, and the rulings in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz are two
good examples of this old adage being played out in real life. The
outward goals of the government in those cases were honorable; in
these uncertain times after the horrors of September 11, 2001, no
one can dispute our need to control the flow of people into the
country. Likewise, one can scarcely turn on the television without
hearing about a tragic accident caused by the foolishness of a
drunk driver. These goals are honorable, and the government was
168. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.
169. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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attempting to address them in the roadblocks that were upheld in
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz. In each of these cases, the Supreme
Court used a balancing test to uphold the government's power to
implement roadblocks.17°
Even though a balancing test was the proper way to analyze
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Supreme Court allowed the "good
intentions" of the police to control, and improperly weighed the
interests involved. In order to allow the government to carry out
its goals, the majorities in these two cases underestimated the
severity of the intrusions caused by the checkpoints. Furthermore,
the government's effectiveness in achieving these goals through
roadblocks was in doubt, especially in the case of the DUI check-
points in Sitz.1" They also failed to consider the probability that
the Framers of the Constitution would have objected to these
roadblocks, as pointed out by both Lidster's Supreme Court brief
and Justice Thomas' dissent in Edmond."2 But the Lidster Court
nevertheless felt that the government's interests outweighed the
individual's. As such, the Court allowed these two police check-
points to stand, and also condoned the use of drivers' license
checkpoints in Prouse. In making these decisions, the Court, in
effect, set a virtual Pandora's Box in front of the government.
The government decided to open this Pandora's Box in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, by attempting to further expand the
powers that had already been given to it. To control the evils that
had been unleashed by the prior interpretations of the balancing
test in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, Justice O'Connor had to come up
with a new test. She could not adhere to stare decisis and use the
Brown balancing test because, as Justice Rehnquist communi-
cated in his dissent, this would result in the Court's acceptance of
the Indianapolis roadblock. "3 Therefore, she invented the "non-
law-enforcement primary purpose test," as Justice Rehnquist
called it. Rehnquist rightly stated in his dissenting analysis that
the Edmond roadblock should have been upheld because it "natu-
rally followed" the reasoning behind the prior decisions. " 4 The
drug checkpoint in Edmond was no more than a mere extrapola-
tion of the powers that were extended to the government through
170. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-62; Sitz, 496 U.S. 451-55.
171. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. See Brief for Respondent at 9-13; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the balancing test in those prior cases; the only difference was
that now there existed the additional purpose of drug control.
At first blush, the Border Patrol and DUI roadblocks sounded
and continue to sound like a good idea to many Americans. How-
ever, the potential for governmental abuse was always obvious
and should have been foreseen by the Court. This abuse material-
ized in the Indianapolis Police Department's drug control road-
block, which would have been constitutional had it not been for
the introduction of Justice O'Connor's new test. Thus, the Ed-
mond decision is a perfect example of why Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz should have been proactively decided in favor of the individ-
ual's liberty interest in being free from suspicionless roadblock
seizures.
If one accepts the premise that the entire decision-making his-
tory that eventually culminated in Lidster was built on shaky
ground, then obviously the Lidster decision itself was ill-advised,
and no further analysis would be necessary. But this is a difficult
issue, and many believe that the Court's decisions have been
proper interpretations of the constitution that have been made in
the best interest of the nation. Therefore, let us objectively ana-
lyze the Lidster decision against the jurisprudence of the Marti-
nez-Fuerte and Sitz decisions, with the "non-law-enforcement pri-
mary purpose test" of Edmond denoting the outer perimeter of
acceptable government conduct.
In Lidster, the Supreme Court did a fine job of differentiating
the facts of the case from those of Edmond.7' The police depart-
ment's stated purpose for the informational roadblock in Lidster
was not that of general crime control, as the Court found to be the
purpose of the Indianapolis roadblock in Edmond; rather, the po-
lice were trying to solve a specific crime. Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion in Edmond was not tailored toward the situation where the
people are being asked to help the police in solving a specific
crime, instead, it was intendded to prevent those roadblocks in
which the police are trying to catch the vehicle's occupants in
some sort of a crime, absent the three exceptions enumerated in
Martinez-Fuerte, Prouse, and Sitz. It would take a very broad
reading of Edmond to reach the conclusion that the Illinois Su-
preme Court had reached, namely that the Edmond decision com-
pelled the outlawing of informational roadblocks. Therefore, Jus-
tice Breyer was correct in stating that the rule of unconstitutional-
175. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 888-91.
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ity that was espoused in Edmond did not apply to the present
case. But this was really just a threshold issue. The Court then
returned the traditional Brown balancing test that they had ne-
glected to use in the Edmond decision.
Regardless of what one might believe about the constitutionality
of DUI checkpoints, United States Border Patrol checkpoints, or
even drivers' license checkpoints, as far as the Brown test is con-
cerned, the facts of the Lidster case fall far below the necessary
degree of governmental interest set forth in the prior cases and
the likelihood that this roadblock would advance that interest
does not rise to the level adjudged necessary by the previous case
law. At the same time, the severity of the intrusion caused by this
roadblock in Lidster was really no less than in the situations at
issue in the prior cases, even though the roadblock was conducted
for more amiable reasons.
First of all, under the facts of Lidster, there was no real gravity
of public concern as there was in the previous cases. It is true
that a person was killed, and solving this crime relates to one of
the most fundamental purposes of government, but it is not as if
this same assailant was driving around at the time of the road-
block, threatening to kill more people, which is the situation with
DUI checkpoints. The ominous threat of drunk drivers on the
road is what compelled the Court to uphold DUI checkpoints in
Sitz. Likewise, the threat of illegal aliens constantly and irre-
versibly streaming into the country amounted to the requisite
grave public concern in Martinez-Fuertes. Both of these cases in-
volved ongoing governmental concerns at the time of the particu-
lar roadblocks in question, but Lidster involved something that
happened in the past. The gravity of this past crime simply does
not have the same magnitude as the ongoing problems in the prior
cases.
Furthermore, the likelihood that this informational checkpoint
would achieve its stated objective by eliciting some helpful infor-
mation seems very implausible. If anyone had seen anything the
night that the crime took place and wanted to help police solve the
crime, they probably would have reported this within the past
week, assuming that the police had publicized the unfortunate
event. One wonders if the police weren't simply inconveniencing
everyone on the road that night in the hopes that the hit-and-run
driver might possibly take the same road a second time; again, the
chances of this happening were very slim indeed. Overall, the
Lidster roadblock does not appear to advance the government's
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interests to anywhere near the degree that the Sitz and Martinez-
Fuertes checkpoints advanced the governmental interests identi-
fied in those cases. For this reason, and because the public con-
cern was not as grave as in prior cases, this roadblock should have
failed the Brown balancing test, and any evidence obtained pursu-
ant to the roadblock should have been excluded from Robert Lid-
ster's trial.
This approach to the Lidster decision may come across as "soft
on crime." But no doubt, the Court's decision in Lidster will
spawn new types of roadblocks and seizures. Maybe they will not
become as commonplace as Justice Freeman of the Illinois Su-
preme Court suggested, "6 but the Supreme Court's decision defi-
nitely encourages police departments to conduct this type of activ-
ity, which will undoubtedly violate the Brown balancing test in
most, if not all, cases. Even if the inconvenience caused by these
informational roadblocks may seem trivial, these ostensibly minor
infractions against the Fourth Amendment rights of United States
citizens cannot be tolerated. In the end, taking a hard line behind
the words of the Fourth Amendment in cases such as Lidster does
not amount to being "soft on crime." To the contrary, it means
having the foresight to realize that, if we do not prevent the grad-
ual erosion of our Constitutionally protected rights, we will wake
up one day to find ourselves living under the same type of all-
powerful government that the Framers of the Constitution once
lived under themselves.
Scott Weeber
176. People v. Lidster (2002), 779 N.E.2d at 860.
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